How Africa Is Facing Up To The Challenge Of Energy Self-Sufficiency ?

In November 2013, the African Development Bank approved funding for the construction of the Inga III Dam (or the Grand Inga), the first phase of the Inga, a much larger energy complex. The Grand Inga, stretching from South Africa to Egypt, thanks to its 39,000 megawatts produced, would provide a permanent supply of electricity for no fewer than 15 countries on the continent.

It is important to examine, through the example of the Inga dam, the ability of African states to carry out their objective of reducing their dependence on external aid in order to regain self-sufficiency in energy.

An Ambitious Project

Initially planned in 1982 by former Congolese leader Mobutu Seseko to supplant the shortcomings of the Inga 1 and 2 dams built during the 1960s, this project never materialised whilst he was in power, with political and security disturbances (civil wars, conflicts at the borders with Rwanda, exactions in North Kivu) having overcome the political fragility of this country.

More than three decades after this abandonment, the Congolese and South African heads of state began new talks to launch this ambitious project once more. Faced with the saturation of technical equipment and components of Inga 1 and 2, the explosion of energy demand in a regional sphere where 60% of inhabitants live without electricity, the renewal of national powering network was a matter of economic urgency and of vital importance. According to Jim Yong Kim, the World Bank Chief Executive, these facilities could solve the “energy apartheid” that the region has been experiencing for several decades.

1.5mis the number of jobs that the Grand Inga project could create

The economic benefits of the Grand Inga are not negligible for the states concerned. Although the spin-offs in terms of job creation are difficult to foresee for this single project, McKinsey estimated in a recent study that it would mean 1.5 million jobs created over the next few years. There is no doubt that a large portion of the workforce will be mobilised in the construction of Inga.

Hydroelectric power is a boon for governments. Due to a much lower consumption cost involved than with hydrocarbons (coal, uranium and petroleum), the extreme volatility of price in recent years, prompting most governments to diversify their operating resources. For example, the cost per kilowatt hour for the Inga project, estimated at $25, is twice as cheap as gas today (at between $47 and $67) despite subsidies from ECOWAS for industrialists in the sector.

On the other hand, the exorbitant cost of such a construction can be largely offset by the realisation of economies of scale – much more frequent with large electrical infrastructures than with small ones. This applies particularly to the Democratic Republic of Congo, which holds 50% of the total production potential of the African continent. The country could benefit from a favourable geographical setting in which the Congo River, the second longest river in Africa, is an undeniable asset. Under these conditions, the unit cost of production per kilowatt-hour would fall sharply because of the volume of water needed to deliver the expected yields.

Some Major Obstacles

The first visible obstacle concerns the financing of the project. Its total cost, estimated at €72bn, is higher than the GDP of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which reached only €39bn in 2015. The difficulty that the government of Joseph Kabila has in honouring its debts in the exploitation of Inga 1 and 2 only amplifies the reluctance of institutional and private donors to finance the Grand Inga. To reassure them, the Congolese authorities undertook to leave the management of the dam to a private entity.

The National Electricity Company (SNEL), a national operator with a monopoly on the distribution and transmission of electricity, is struggling to fulfil its mission to cover the national grid due to a lack of resources. This example demonstrates once again the burden borne by the corruption and incompetence of the leaders of major groups in the mismanagement of services of general interest.

One of the major shortcomings of the Grand Inga is the ecological issues involved. Many NGOs have criticised the World Bank for its lack of rigour in assessing the risks the project poses to the region. The construction of electric dams, involving the redevelopment of land surfaces on the shores of river coasts, is one of the main factors in the disappearance of marine species (fish, plankton, and so on) and terrestrial mammals.

Dams Vs Ecosystems

By 2014, the World Bank estimated that more than 6,300 people were displaced as a result of the destruction of homes. Inga III would run the risk of an over-monopolization of the Congo River by these infrastructures, which would affect the daily lives of the rural populations living in the surrounding areas as well at the level of the valley of the Bundi River Of these river areas. These communities, mainly from the fisheries and aquaculture trade, would see a large portion of their agricultural land devastated by the soil erosion caused by the dam.

According to Peter Bosshard, Director of International Rivers:

“The construction of hydroelectric power plants is incompatible with safeguarding the ecosystem of Great Lakes Africa due to the excessive amount of aquatic resources needed for their operation.”

However, the conclusions of the American NGO, which recommends a massive investment in the development of renewable energies (solar and wind) and the construction of smaller hydropower plants, are puzzling. Guaranteeing the distribution of electricity to the greatest number of people by extending the networks necessarily means an impact on the ecosystem of the region.

In addition, solar and wind energy have extremely limited production capacities compared to those displayed by gas and coal-fired hydroelectric plants. The installation of thousands of solar panels or wind turbines, in addition to increasing the spatial saturation of the territory, would not be enough to fill the energy deficit of this zone.

According to the World Bank projections, by 2040 only 6% of total electricity production in sub-Saharan Africa will be directly realised from the exploitation of these green hydroelectric sources, with 27% through coal-burning.

The Shortcomings of Regional Powers

Beyond the structural economic weaknesses of the African continent, Grand Inga demonstrates once again how much the continental states remain dependent on external financial, technical and material aid for the realisation of their ambitions.

The absence of a national company capable of supplanting the French EDF and American firm AECOM in the feasibility study phase of the project testifies to the difficulty of some African countries in dealing with the large mastodons of the energy industry – despite the vast potential of these territories.

After the first call for tenders launched in 2015, no African firm was among the consortia shortlisted to carry out the work. Thus China’s Three Gorges, South Korea’s Posco, and Spain’s ACS and Eurofinsa are currently the only serious contenders.

620m is the number of electricity-deprived Sub-Saharan Africans

Sub-Saharan Africa is a typical case of the low impact of macroeconomic policies on the daily life of local communities. Today, no less than 620 million inhabitants (or 48% of the population) are deprived of electricity in this region.

While the Congolese government has the ambition to surpass the 60% of the population with access to electricity by 2025, many analysts remain sceptical of the government’s ability to improve people’s daily lives. Indeed, even in areas where access to electricity is relatively developed, energy consumption rates remain very low compared to those in emerging countries (due to a low per capita GDP).

This raises the question of the conflicting interests and contradictions to which certain states, including the DRC, are confronted in their quest to increase their international influence. Indeed, it is ironic that Inga III, whose purpose is the supply of electricity to a quarter of the continent, is not in a position to mitigate the microeconomic failures observed in the Congolese energy market.

This problem only masks several others, including the sharing of material wealth and added value between the different components of Congolese society.

The Low Purchasing Power

There are many indications that the Congolese government will prefer – as with most of its projects for the construction of energy installations previously launched – strictly industrial exploitation of these energy pools, to the detriment of the needs of citizens. The deplorable state of communication networks and the isolation of the rural populations and of certain provinces such as the Kasaï-Oriental (in the centre of the DRC) leads us to question the effectiveness of such a strategy.

Apart from the fact that the lack of technical and material resources of the regional powers considerably slows down the progress of this major project, private investors remain sceptical about its potential profitability. The low purchasing power of Congolese, Zambians and Angolans reinforces the private sector’s doubts about the ability of these populations to achieve a high level of consumption at average prices.

The imbalances and irregularities observed in the energy consumption market can also be explained by the particular demographic structure of these countries, some of which have not yet completed their urban transition.

The power requirements of rural populations, which are sometimes difficult to estimate, pose many logistical problems for the provincial administrative authorities. Due to the complexity of the road tracing process and the transmission of electricity to remote rural areas, it is very likely that the price per kilowatt hour will be increased.

Regional Cooperation Questioned

While, for a long time, regional economic cooperation has been favoured for international influence and as a diplomatic instrument facilitating access to prosperity, it is clear that this model has been running out of fashion in recent years. Given the complexity of certain projects such as the Grand Inga, which require significant logistical means in terms of imports and the transport of people and materials, African states are often forced to favor the financing of their projects through institutional donors, mostly non-African, and thus yielding to their demands to the detriment of the interests of the local populations.

Free trade agreements promoted by interstate structures prove ineffective because of African leaders’ low propensity to implement international agreements at the national level. The economic crisis of 2008, having significantly affected the performance of national export economies, has only slowed down the process of creating unique markets.

Faced with the sometimes inconclusive results of measures to deregulate and harmonise commercial and legal standards, some leaders resume the use of unilateral policies, resulting in the maintenance or re-establishment of non-tariff barriers (subsidies paid to private companies, binding legal norms for African investors). For example, the bilateral agreements with China proved to be more fruitful and less binding, as evidenced by the 2015 partnership between South Africa and China which included the construction of a nuclear power plant.

In the electricity generation market, the regional integration of African countries has led, since the 1990s, to the creation of regional power pools, bringing together the main electricity companies with each of the states’ members of the intergovernmental organisation in question. For example, the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) was established in 1995 under the leadership of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The objective of forming a new energy competitiveness cluster has not yet been achieved due to a lack of public investment in scientific research and the purchase of materials. The budgets allocated to the SADC remain insufficient to claim a geographical extension of the era of activity of the electric companies.

Conclusion

It is in the summer of 2017 that the Congolese State will designate the great winner of the call for tenders for the construction of Inga III. Whatever its identity, it will have the heavy task of including a whole continent within a project that mobilises a number of economic and political actors, among which states and regional integration organisations remain in spite of the difficulties faced.

Groenland : la fonte de la tranquillité ?

Réflexion sur l’impact des activités d’extraction minière et d’uranium au sein du territoire groenlandais

Le 20 janvier 2016, les gouvernements Groenlandais et Danois sont parvenus à des accords de négociation portant sur l’exportation d’uranium extrait sur le territoire groenlandais.
Petit pays d’à peine 56 000 habitants, le Groenland est aujourd’hui en passe d’entamer une révolution énergétique, grâce à l’exploitation des larges quantités de ressources fossiles endormies dans son sous-sol. Toutefois, la volonté du pouvoir d’accélérer ce processus se heurte à une partie de la société civile, dont certaines franges s’avèrent de plus en plus hostiles à l’égard de ces projets.


                                            Jérémie Kasongo et Brice Houbart


« A coup sûr, cela saccagerait notre magnifique paysage » se plaint Ellen Frederiksen, éleveuse du petit village de Qassiarsuk, à propos du risque que ferait peser l’installation d’activités d’extraction minières. Ellen n’est pas la seule de cet avis. Comme elle, bon nombre d’habitants du sud du pays éprouvent une forte inquiétude à l’idée de voir débarquer de nouvelles usines d’extraction minière polluantes à proximité de leur habitat. De nombreuses lettres et pétitions exigeant l'annulation de ces projets ont été transmises auprès des autorités politiques locales, mais force est de constater qu’elles semblent pour le moment insuffisantes. Les responsables régionaux insistent sur les bienfaits que cela pourrait engendrer en termes de création d’emplois. Avec une population aussi divisée, l’issue de cette bataille reste incertaine.  

C’est en 2013 que le parlement du Groenland vota l’abrogation de la loi de 1988 prévoyant la politique d’extraction zéro des matières radioactives, et fit ainsi entrer le pays dans une nouvelle ère industrielle. Comme à Qassiarsuk, plusieurs villes du pays ont vu leur quotidien chamboulé suite à l’annonce et au démarrage effectif de projets d’extraction minière. Le projet de Kvanefjeld a sans doute été celui suscitant le plus de crispations. Connu comme étant le second gisement le plus grand au monde en termes de quantité d’uranium  , il a fait l’objet de plusieurs études attestant de sa dangerosité pour l’écosystème. Un rapport publié en 2014 par Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen, spécialiste des énergies renouvelables, a confirmé cette thèse. Des milliers de tonnes de particules de poussières radioactives seraient relâchées chaque année, exposant directement les habitants de Narsaq, commune à proximité, aux vents violents faisant circuler ces particules.

D’après Niels Henrik Hooge, militant écologiste anti-uranium danois, « ces extractions d’uranium s’avèrent incompatibles avec le maintien des quatre grands secteurs de l’économie que sont la pêche, la chasse, le tourisme et la production alimentaire. De plus, le développement de la filière uranium, s’il est autorisé, ne jouera pas un grand rôle dans le développement économique du pays ».

A contrario certaines voies se veulent plus optimistes. C’est le cas par exemple de Daniel Kirchtern, ingénieur en métallurgie qui assure que l’extraction d’uranium fait peser un faible risque de contamination des sols et des eaux. « Les résidus miniers et sources d’eau provenant de ces exploitations sont isolés du reste de l’environnement. »  

Parallèlement aux projets miniers actuellement en cours, le Groenland connaît des résultats beaucoup moins probants en termes de développement de ses activités pétrolières.  « Nous poursuivrons notre stratégie de développement axée sur nos ressources fossiles   » entonnait le Premier Ministre Kim Kielsen en décembre, en dépit des mauvaises perspectives annoncées sur l’évolution du cours du baril. Il faut dire que les annonces soudaines des compagnies pétrolières, ayant fait part de leurs intentions de retirer leurs activités du pays, sont tombées au mauvais moment.

Les autorités avaient pourtant, depuis 5 ans, distribué sans compter des licences d’exploitation aux compagnies étrangères souhaitant se lancer dans cet eldorado glacial. Les conditions climatiques ardues, le manque d’infrastructures adéquates ont définitivement conforté dans leur choix les grandes compagnies pétrolières, dont les techniques d’extraction ne sont pas encore suffisamment développées pour palier à ces contraintes environnementales.

« Des explorations pétrolières sont toujours en cours, mais à moindre échelle. L’intérêt des majors pétrolières pour ce pays ne disparaîtra pas de sitôt » nous a affirmé un membre du Ministère des Finances. Si le ton de ce fonctionnaire se veut rassurant, les déclarations du chef du gouvernement l’an dernier ont toutefois mis à mal (pour le moment) le rêve de certains de constituer un eldorado pétrolier. Celui-ci avait notamment qualifié cette situation de « frustrante » dans la mesure où elle mettait un frein brutal à leurs ambitions.

Des aspirations indépendantistes

Au-delà des potentielles retombées économiques dont le Groenland pourrait bénéficier, cette stratégie d’expansion énergétique masque une profonde volonté de s’émanciper définitivement de la tutelle de Copenhague. Depuis la promulgation en 2009 du traité reconnaissant l’autonomie de cet Etat et mettant fin à plus d’un siècle d’appartenance à l’Etat danois, les élites nationales ont, semble-t-il, décidé de tourner définitivement cette page.

Les tensions apparues entre les deux pays lors du Conseil de l’Arctique en 2013 n’ont fait que confirmer cette tendance. Aleqa Hammond, chef du gouvernement groenlandais de l’époque, avait alors fait le choix de boycotter le conseil de l’Arctique en arguant le manque de représentativité des personnalités présentes. Les trois pouvoirs régaliens (justice, défense et affaires étrangères) sont encore détenus par le Royaume danois et de nombreuses voies appellent à un changement radical de cette situation. Toutefois, ce sont autant les résistances du gouvernement danois que les conflictualités entre formations politiques nationales qui ralentissent ce processus. L’Inuit Ataqatigiit, principale force d’opposition de tendance socialiste et indépendantiste (tout comme le parti Simiut au pouvoir) avait par exemple réclamé la tenue d’un référendum sur l’extraction d’uranium.


Une économie chamboulée ?

Uranium, terres-rares, fer, zinc, plomb : les ressources en minerais ne manquent pas sur le territoire national et pas moins de dix compagnies minières ont déjà entamé depuis 2013 des projets d’envergure à divers endroits du pays. Mais tous ces projets n’apparaissent pas aussi fructueux. En novembre 2014, le britannique London Mining, impliqué dans l’exploitation de la mine de fer d’Isua, annonçait sa faillite   et fut placé sous redressement, suite aux pertes financières de la compagnie en Sierra Leone.

D’autre part, le ralentissement économique (brutal) de la Chine menace la pérennité des relations commerciales entre Nuuk et les firmes chinoises, susceptibles de diminuer leurs investissements et leurs ressources humaines. A titre d’exemple la firme chinoise General Nice, qui a remplacée London Mining à Isua, a revu ses objectifs d’investissements à la baisse   en raison de la chute des cours mondiaux du fer. Dans ce contexte, les marges des producteurs restent trop faibles dans certains segments de marché. Jiangxi Copper, filiale de Jiangxi Union Mining et spécialisée dans l’extraction de cuivre, semble quant à elle maintenir son cahier des charges.

Le citoyen : grand perdant ?

D’après le Conseil Circumpolaire Inuit (ICC), organisation de défense des droits des populations Inuits, l’opposition des habitants aux projets d’extraction d’uranium est de plus en plus forte à mesure que la distance entre leur lieu d’habitation et les installations diminue. « Pour ceux ayant un métier les mettant en relation directe avec les touristes, l’inquiétude est d’autant plus forte de voir ces derniers changer de destination par crainte des rejets radioactifs », révèle l’un de ses représentants. En outre, l’apparition de tensions sociales se fait fortement ressentir dans certaines zones. « Certaines familles et voisins ne s’adressent plus la parole ».

La population s’oppose majoritairement à cette politique. Elle craint l’arrivée de nombreux travailleurs étrangers principalement issus d’Asie du Sud-Est pouvant entraîner un dumping social et des problèmes culturels. Elle reproche également un manque de transparence concernant les discussions entre l’Etat et les entreprises mais aussi l’absence de référendum sur ces questions déterminantes quant à l’avenir du pays.

L’absence de référendum alimente le sentiment de mise à l’écart de la population. Ce comportement jugé antidémocratique des élites, en dépit de leur volonté manifeste de rendre à leur nation une fierté (volée ?) par la « bête danoise », ne semble pas calmer les ardeurs des ONG qui poursuivent leurs mouvements de contestation. C’est le cas à Inatsisartut, siège du parlement où campent depuis le 13 mai des activistes de l’organisation NOAH réclamant l’instauration d’un scrutin référendaire sur l’extraction de l’uranium.

Des enjeux géostratégiques de premier ordre

L’incroyable quantité de ressources minières dont dispose actuellement le pays ne suscite pas uniquement l’appétit des compagnies étrangères, mais provoque aussi la jalousie et la méfiance de nombreux Etats étrangers, qui craignent une diminution de leurs parts de marché dans la production et l’exportation de certaines ressources, au profit de l’archipel nordique. C’est le cas notamment de la Chine qui, en cas de développement d’une filière groenlandaise des terres-rares, verrait son monopole de production de terres-rares (80% de la production mondiale) s’effriter considérablement. On estime à 25% la part des besoins mondiaux en terres-rares auxquels le Groenland serait susceptible de répondre dans les générations futures.

La peur de Pékin réside dans le fait que les puissances occidentales pourraient se détourner brutalement du marché chinois au profit du marché groenlandais. Par ailleurs, l’Union Européenne, partenaire clé du pays, pourrait tirer bénéfice de cette diversification du marché en s’appuyant sur le Groenland, afin de réduire sa dépendance aux importations de minerais chinois. Le Groenland s’appuie notamment sur les prêts accordés par la Banque Européenne d’Investissement, ainsi que les fonds transférés via les programmes d’aides au développement accordés par la Commission Européenne, estimés à 230 millions d’euros.

Ainsi, l’industrialisation des filières minières et pétrolières, atouts stratégiques majeurs dans le cadre du projet d’indépendance nationale, ferait néanmoins peser de lourds risques écologiques et sociaux au Groenland. L’hostilité d’une large part de la population ne semble pas faire reculer le gouvernement qui compte bien profiter de ces chantiers énergétiques afin d’attirer les investisseurs étrangers et entamer une diversification de l’économie. Mais le rapport de force qui oppose pros et anti-uraniums semble ces derniers temps pencher en faveur des premiers : le 8 juin dernier, l’Assemblée parlementaire danoise promulguait une loi autorisant les exportations d’uranium en provenance du Groenland. Nul doute que cette première victoire de Kim Kielsen sur le terrain législatif, constitue un grand pas vers la transformation énergétique de ce pays.  

Jérémie Kasongo et Brice Houbart, pour le Monde Diplomatique

Bibliographie

• « New report confirms that the Kvanefjeld mining project is not sustainable », Danish Ecological Council (28 Avril 2014)

• Peter LEVRING - « Oil Approaching $35 Final Blow to Greenland's Exploration Dreams », Bloomberg (14 Décembre 2016)

• Tim BOERSMA & Kevin FOLEY - « Dark Clouds Gather over Greenland's Mining Ambitions », Brookings (15 Janvier 2015)

• Gwladys FOUCHE - « Chinese firm unlikely to develop $2 billion Greenland iron ore mine soon: minister », UK Reuters (26 Janvier 2016)

• Keith VERONESE – « If we want to keep the Gadgets coming, let’s mine Greenland », Wired (4 Février 2015)

• « Uranium Export Legislation Passed in Greenland and Denmark », Investing News Network (8 Juin 2016)

Russia vs Turkey : the consequences of a new Eurasian clash

The economic sanctions imposed by the Russian Federation on Turkey, following the shutdown of a Russian airplane by the Turkish Army, have revealed an inconvenient truth: the “peaceful era” that Eurasia have known for a decade is ending.

The two main sectors that could be damaged are tourism and energy. But the appearance of this rivalry could have a knock on effect, not only of Turkish and Russian populations but also on all of Eurasia. In this context, we may wonder if Russia could allow itself to begin a new economic war ?

If we take a look at the historical relationships that unite these political powers, this scenario seems unimaginable. Indeed, the two countries appear to be economically and politically interdependent.

2000’s decade has been a period deeply emphasized by the born, then a reinforcement of strong financial partnerships through ambitious free trade agreements such as food‘s imports treaties. Since 1997, date of the creation of BSTDB (Black Sea Trade and Development Bank) that both countries joined, Turkey became the second most important foreign trading partner after Germany.

In 2010, President Medvedev and Erdogan (who still held the function of Prime Minister at this period) signed 17 agreements to enhance cooperation’s in energies and economic fields. Among them, a treaty planned the implementation of Akkuyu plant, which should become the first nuclear power plant in Turkey. ROSATOM, a Russian state-corporation has been elected to be the builder.

One of the main topic that prevails about these escalating diplomatic tensions is the Turkish Stream project. This natural gas pipeline building project was announced in December 2014 by Vladimir Putin following the cancellation of South Stream Project (with Ukraine). Its aim was to provide gas to Western Europe through Turkish-Greek border. Turkish Stream has to complete Blue Stream, a trans-Black Sea pipeline built in 2003 by Gazprom and BOTAS. The large expansion of the quantity of Russian gas supplied Europe since the 1991 has allowed Turkey to become a reliable transit partner.

Despite of the increase of bilateral treaties, regional cooperation has not allowed Putin and Erdogan to reach all their ambitions. EU sanctions over Russia after military’s intervention in Crimea, and military’s intervention in Syria have slow down many of their economic development programs. At the Turkish side, the low rhythm of Akkuyu’s building, scheduled on 2020, is a huge constraint: domestic energy sources (hydraulic energy and coal) are still limited which make the country highly dependent on imports of oil and gas for electricity’s production. Turkish electricity’s demand rate has been one of the highest of Eurasia these last years even if Turkish population growth rate seems slowly downing.

At first glance, we could think that a new rivalry of two major Black Sea’s regional political power, could weaken anti-Western alliances that emerged these last decade and tip the balance of power in favor of European Union and the United States. The new containment strategy that consists of isolating Putin (and China) by depriving him most of his (potential) allies seems to work. Furthermore, as a NATO member, a European Union member candidate and also US ally in the Middle East, Turkey has no other choices but to refrain Putin’s operations in the region in order to guarantee the trust of its Western allies.

On second thoughts, we should remind that EU has still to worry about its dependence on Russian gas resources that it completely failed to reduce. As an example, the TAFTA, which was destined to counterbalance EU’s gas dependence on Russia by diversifying new energy sources, is not ready at all. Transatlantic trade partnership arose numerous criticisms from some NGO’s or political figures who insist on how environmentally risky shale gas extraction and carbon gas storage would be for French soils, especially their large agricultural lands. Another “alternative”, the Algerian gas’s transport, would not be viable and could become too expensive on the long run.

Last but not least, Erdogan and Putin’s several attempts to reinforce economic partnerships with China reveals how crucial being part of Chinese market has become. On one hand, China’s billion consumers provide a very long term source of revenues for Russian firms; on the other hand Sino-Turkish military cooperation has amplified the modernization of Turkish armed forces. The pressure US puts on Erdogan to progressively move away from BRICS is obviously ineffective. Running on from their common involvement in Silk Road Belt’s initiative, Ankara discussed with Beijing last July about the possibility of giving up dollars in bilateral trade and replacing it by national currencies (lira and yuan). Assuming that this initiative materializes itself in a near future, this would echo to Sino-Russian deal made last year which bypassed the dollar as trade currency. Despite of their tumultuous relationships, Russia, Turkey, are, with Chinese help, taking the same path : putting an end on US monetary and financial global hegemony. 

Sources

• Against the Dollar: China, Turkey Want to Trade in National Currencies, Sputnik News

• China, Russia and the Still-Almighty Dollar, US News

• Russia-Turkey annual trade could reach $100bn, RT Business

• Russia and Turkey agree on visa-free travel, RT Business

• Russia looks to punish Turkey for downing warplane by cutting economic ties, investments, US News

• Turkey - Russia tensions: 4 reasons neither country can afford a trade war, CNN

• Turkey Suddenly Remembers It's Part of NATO and Decides Not to Buy Chinese Weapons, Vice News

• "Turkish Stream and Russian gas" (picture), oilprice.com